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THE MOMENT OF TRUTH FOR fMRI: WILL DECEPTION DETECTION
PASS ADMISSIBILITY HURDLES IN OKLAHOMA?
© 2010 Julie Elizabeth Myers ∗

I. Introduction
For decades, authors like George Orwell, Ayn Rand and Ray Bradbury have
depicted catastrophic visions of dystopia arising out of our society’s advancement: a
world where the government sees all and men must fear their own thoughts.1 Conversely,
the ability to prove veracity has been a power sought by society throughout history,
evident in all cultures from the oracles of ancient mythology to the “veritaserum” in the
Harry Potter series.2 The clash of these two interests may seem to be exaggerated in
novels like 1984, Fahrenheit 451 and Anthem,3 but this balance may soon be evaluated in
Oklahoma courts in a very real way. On June 12, 2008, a woman in India was convicted
of murder based on evidence that included a “brain fingerprinting” scan, which
essentially analyzed the content of her memory and found her brain to contain stored
knowledge regarding the circumstances of the murder.4 This is the first instance of
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RAY BRADBURY, FAHRENHEIT 451 (Simon & Schuster 2003) (1966); GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (Penguin
Books 2003) (1949); AYN RAND, ANTHEM (Coyote Canyon Press 2008) (1938).
2
In the young adult literature series Harry Potter, “veritaserum” is a powerful magical potion which
compels truthful answers from the drinker. J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE ORDER OF THE
PHOENIX 744 (2003).
3
See supra note 1.
4
Anand Giridharadas, India’s Novel Use of Brain Scans in Courts Is Debated, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008,
at A10.
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neuro-lie-detection technology to have been admitted for the prosecution in court
anywhere, and the reactions range from enthusiasm to horror.5
The battle over admitting neuroimagery evidence has been heated since the
widely publicized trial of John Hinckley, Jr., for his assassination attempt on President
Reagan.6 In that case, computer tomography scans were admitted to prove that Hinckley
was incapable of the mental state required for the crime, and the resulting acquittal by
reason of insanity caused outrage.7 Some proponents of neuro-imaging evidence point to
the use of neuro scanning technology in Roper v. Simmons as an endorsement of neuroevidence by the United States Supreme Court.8 However, the most recent advancements
claim not simply to scan the brain for functional or developmental deficiency as in these
past cases, but to truly translate a person’s thought process from the images.9 Although
India’s novel ruling has raised serious ethical questions of whether such evidence is
reliable enough for use in court,10 the potential for new neuroimaging methods is
undeniably astonishing. Functional magnetic resonance imaging, or fMRI, as a liedetector is especially promising, 11 despite the fact that other forms of lie detection
technology have been held inadmissible for over eighty years.12 Although there is some
debate over the exact accuracy of fMRI, to date, this technology has even demonstrated
the ability to recognize a specific item - such as a screwdriver or a window - that a person
5

Id.
O. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the “Complexity” of Capital Punishment, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1265,
1293 (2007).
7
United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
8
See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
9
The newest scanning technologies, like fMRI, about which this article focuses, can recognize different
types of cognitive patterns which directly correspond to thoughts − this is discussed throughout.
10
Giridharadas, supra note 4, at A10.
11
Mark Pettit, Jr., FMRI and BF Meet FRE: Brain Imaging and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 33 AM. J. L.
& MED. 319, 320 (2007).
12
Eric K. Gerard, Waiting in the Wings? The Admissibility of Neuroimagery for Lie Detection, 27 DEV.
MENTAL HEALTH L. 1, 24 (2008).
6
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is thinking of merely by reading the computerized images of that person’s brain
activity.13 Proponents claim the ability of fMRI technology to discern truth from
deception will soon be absolute.14
Case law on these advanced deception detection technologies is sparse at best, but
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has had one of the few unique opportunities to
confront the early use of neuro-lie-detection evidence.15 Because the Oklahoma
Evidence Code parallels the Federal Rules of Evidence regarding expert testimony, an
understanding of federal interpretation concerning novel science will be significant for
fMRI evidence in Oklahoma. In fact, early cases of neuro scanning evidence in
Oklahoma may have great influence on the outcome of the battle over fMRI admissibility
in many jurisdictions. This comment will discuss fMRI and its chances at admissibility
in Oklahoma courts and in the Tenth Circuit, which both follow the Daubert decision
when evaluating novel scientific evidence, and propose an explanation of why it should
be admitted as reliable. Part II of this comment will give a succinct explanation of how
fMRI functions for lie detection purposes. Part III will present an overview of the
standard for novel science admissibility and review how the Daubert standard has been
applied in Oklahoma courts. Part IV will discuss the likelihood that fMRI technology
will succeed under a proper Daubert analysis by considering the four factors of
reliability. Part V will cover several other considerations that may hinder the
admissibility of fMRI evidence in Oklahoma courts, even if it passes the Daubert

13

How Technology May Soon “Read” Your Mind, 60 Minutes: Incredible Research Lets Scientists Get a
Glimpse at Your Thoughts, CBS NEWS, Jan. 4, 2009,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/12/31/60minutes/main4694713.shtml [hereinafter CBS NEWS].
14
Telephone Interview with Joel Huizenga, founder and CEO, No Lie MRI, Inc. (Jan. 19, 2009).
15
Slaughter v. State, 2005 OK CR 2, ¶ 7, 105 P.3d 832, 834.
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standard, including Oklahoma Evidence Code section 2403, province of the jury
concerns, and our society’s cultural aversion to “mind reading” technology. This
comment will conclude with Part VI.
II. Understanding fMRI Deception Detection
The term “lie detector” is most commonly associated with a fairly dated
technology known as the polygraph test, so an understanding of the differences between
this procedure and fMRI is important.16 The original polygraph test was performed by
measuring systolic blood pressure; spikes in blood pressure were assumed to be a
physical manifestation of the anxiety caused by lying.17 Improvements in polygraph
procedure include monitoring respiration, skin resistance and cardiovascular function.18
This data is recorded by machine, and the end result of such a test is actually an
interpretation of the test subject’s physical reaction data by a human technician, or
polygrapher.19 The human variable of the test - that is the personality of the polygrapher
or the methods of asking questions - can affect the results of a polygraph.20 The
polygrapher may have increased influence when beginning the test by intentionally
instilling fear in the test subject, which is a common practice.21 These methods are not
always accurate, both because the polygraph test only reflects physical reactions to stress
that may or may not be the result of answering falsely, and because of the possibility of

16

See Leo Kittay, Note, The Cultural Bias Against “Mind Reading” Devices, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 1351,
1356 (2007).
17
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
18
John C. Bush, Warping the Rules: How Some Courts Misapply Generic Evidentiary Rules to Exclude
Polygraph Evidence, 59 VAND. L. REV. 539, 540 (2006).
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Lloyd C. Peeples, III, et al., Exculpatory Polygraphs in the Courtroom: How the Truth May Not Set You
Free, 28 CUMB. L. REV. 77, 79 (1998).
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numerous uncontrolled variables.22 The results can be skewed by either the involuntary
anxiety of a nervous person who is answering truthfully or by induced anxiety, such as a
person flexing their muscles during truthful answers to even out the results.23
Furthermore, certain people are simply very skilled at controlling their physiological
responses to lying.24
In 1998, the Supreme Court faced its most recent case challenging the admission
of polygraph evidence, this time in court-martial proceedings, and held that “there is
simply no consensus that polygraph evidence is reliable.”25 Because the reliability of this
test has always been questioned26 it has been ruled inadmissible by not only the United
States Supreme Court in Frye v. United States, in 1923,27 but time and time again by
numerous United States Circuit Courts, including the Tenth Circuit in United States v.
Call, in 1997.28 Polygraph evidence has continued to be excluded even after the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence’s more flexible standard for assessing such
methods.29 Although United States v. Posado was a remarkable case where the Fifth
Circuit held that a per se ban on polygraph evidence was untenable,30 concerns about the
reliability of the process have consistently kept polygraph results out of court.31

22

Bush, supra note 18, at 542.
Kittay, supra note 16, at 1364.
24
Laurence R. Trancredi, Neuroscience Developments and the Law, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW:
BRAIN, MIND, AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 71, 103 (Brent Garland ed., 2004).
25
United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 309 (1998).
26
Michael J. Ligons, Polygraph Evidence: Where Are We Now?, 65 MO. L. REV. 209, 214 (2000).
27
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
28
United States v. Call, 129 F.3d 1402, 1405 (10th Cir. 1997).
29
There is a continuing line of cases that excludes polygraph evidence after the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, in 1977, and these cases are discussed immediately supra.
30
United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 436 (5th Cir. 1995).
31
Polygraph evidence has been consistently held to be unreliable and therefore inadmissible in court.
Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 309 (“there is simply no consensus that polygraph evidence is reliable”); Call, 129
F.3d at 1405 (“polygraph evidence is neither reliable nor admissible”); United States v. Scarborough, 43
F.3d 1021, 1026 (6th Cir. 1994) (polygraph tests are “inherently unreliable”); State v. Ulland, 943 P.2d
947, 954 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997) (“the results of a polygraph examination are too unreliable to be admissible
23
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In contrast, fMRI deception detection is an entirely different scientific process. It
does not share most of the concerns associated with the polygraph because fMRI
considers not the outward physical manifestations of a lie, but rather examines the source
of the false answer - the mental process of lying.32 Current deception detection using
fMRI began as a test developed in 2001 by Daniel Langleben, M.D, at the University of
Pennsylvania, to analyze the areas of a person’s brain activated during a lie.33 The
science behind fMRI is intense, but the concept is fairly easy to understand: when you are
telling the truth, only the memory regions of your brain become active and are detected in
the fMRI, but when you are lying your brain lights up like fireworks.34 fMRI measures
the oxygen levels in different neural regions, known as the blood oxygen level dependent,
or BOLD effect.35 These oxygen levels directly correlate to the amount of metabolism
(or cellular activity) in that area, so that higher the oxygen levels express more activity
present in a certain neural region.36 “[E]ngaging in deception requires additional
cognitive processing that will involve centers in the brain controlling executive functions
such as problem solving, planning, and the conscious manipulation of information in
working memory.”37

at trial”); Morgan v. Commonwealth, 809 S.W.2d 704, 706 (Ky. 1991) (“the results of polygraph
examinations are unreliable and are therefore inadmissible”); Fulton v. State, 541 P.2d 871, 872 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1975) (polygraphs are inadmissible “in light of the potential unreliability of polygraph
examinations”).
32
Sean A. Spence et al., Behavioural and Functional Anatomical Correlates of Deception in Humans, 12
NEUROREPORT 2849, 2849-50 (2001).
33
Daniel D. Langleben et al., Brain Activity During Simulated Deception: An Event-Related Functional
Magnetic Resonance Study, 15 NEUROIMAGE 727, 727-28 (2002) [hereinafter Langleben et al., Brain
Activity].
34
John G. New, If You Could Read My Mind: Implications of Neurological Evidence for Twenty-First
Century Criminal Jurisprudence, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 179, 180 (2008).
35
Archie Alexander, Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Lie Detection: Is a “Brainstorm” Heading
Toward the “Gatekeeper”?, 7 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 15-20 (2006).
36
Id.
37
New, supra note 34, at 181.
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Studies even report that this technology can distinguish between different types of
deception: isolated lies, spontaneous lies and “well-rehearsed lies that fit into a coherent
story.”38 This suggests that no matter how well prepared a person is or how often a story
has been repeated the fMRI will detect intentional falsity. Also, to accentuate the
difference between memory and creative thinking, examiners could pose the questions in
an unanticipated way that would ensure at least some additional processing even if the
subject had prepared a logical false story beforehand. However, fMRI is not a crystal
ball that can reveal all answers. It can only recognize a lie; it cannot retrieve alternative
information from a person’s mind.39 Also, because it detects deception, it retains one
limitation of the polygraph: the inability to discern the truth from subjectively honest but
inaccurate or erroneously recalled statements.40
Although experts are still investigating exactly which neural areas are linked to
specific cognitive processes involved with lying, the consensus is that far more regions
activate during any type of deception than during a statement of truth, and that these are
different from the regions associated with truth.41 The current evidence from these
38

G. Ganis et al., Neural Correlates of Different Types of Deception: An fMRI Investigation, 13 CEREBRAL
CORTEX 830, 830 (2003).
39
Gerard, supra note 12.
40
Id.
41
The following are a list of current fMRI studies regarding deception detection: Nobuhito Abe et al.,
Deceiving Others: Distinct Neural Responses of the Prefrontal Cortex and Amygdala in Simple Fabrication
and Deception with Social Interactions, 19 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 287 (2007); C. Davatzikos et al.,
Classifying Spatial Patterns of Brain Activity with Machine Learning Methods: Application to Lie
Detection, 28 NEUROIMAGE 663 (2005); Ganis, supra note 38; Nathan J. Gordon et al., Integrated Zone
Comparison Polygraph Technique Accuracy with Scoring Algorithms, 87 PHYSIOLOGY & BEHAV. 251
(2006); F.A. Kozel et al., Functional MRI Detection of Deception After Committing a Mock Sabotage
Crime, 54 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1 (2009) [hereinafter Kozel et al., Functional MRI Detection]; F.A. Kozel et al.,
Detecting Deception Using Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 58 BIOL. PSYCHIATRY 605 (2005)
[hereinafter Kozel et al., Detecting Deception]; F.A. Kozel et al., A Pilot Study of Functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging Brain Correlates of Deception in Healthy Young Men, 16 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY CLIN.
NEUROSCI. 3 (2004) [hereinafter Kozel et al., A Pilot Study]; F.A. Kozel et al., A Replication Study of the
Neural Correlates of Deception, 118 BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE 852 (2004); Daniel D. Langleben et al.,
Telling Truth from Lie in Individual Subjects with Fast Event-Related fMRI, 26 HUM. BRAIN MAPPING 262
(2005); Langleben et al., Brain Activity, supra note 33; Feroze B. Mohamed et al., Functional MR Imaging
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studies supports increased activation associated with different lying processes in the
bilateral, ventrolateral, dorsolateral, inferolateral, dorsal medial, ventromedial and right
anterior prefrontal corices, the amygdala, the anterior cingulate, areas of the parietal and
temporal lobe, and certain sub-cortical regions.42 This information is processed through
increasingly advanced computer software, which produces vivid and tangible snapshots
of neural activity during different questions that can be examined and compared,
potentially by a jury.43
Any promising new technology raises questions of whether it is reliable enough
for use outside the research context, such as admissibility in court, but experts are putting
forth great effort to increase the accuracy of fMRI deception detection and achieve
admissibility.44 According to Joel Huizenga, founder and CEO of No Lie MRI, Inc., the
reliability is already confirmed as quite high. Currently, the accuracy is around 93%, but
Huizenga expects to surpass 95% accuracy soon.45 Steven Laken, Ph. D., president and
CEO of Cephos Corporation, is endorsing an even higher rate, up to 97% accuracy.46
Criminal defendant’s are now anxious for this technology to be ruled admissible.47 This
is because these two key companies, No Lie MRI, Inc., and Cephos Corporation, have
already begun marketing fMRI deception detection as a litigation tool that will provide

and Polygraph Investigation – Initial Experience, 238 RADIOLOGY 679 (2006); Jennifer M. Nuñez et al.,
Intentional False Responding Shares Neural Substrates with Response Conflict and Cognitive Control, 25
NEUROIMAGE 267 (2005); K. Luan Phan et al., Neural Correlates of Telling Lies: A Functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging Study at 4 Tesla, 12 ACAD. RADIOLOGY 164 (2005); Tatia M. C. Lee et al., Lie
Detection by Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 15 HUM. BRAIN MAPPING 157 (2002); Spence et
al., supra note 32.
42
See supra text accompanying note 41.
43
Kittay, supra note 16, at 1368.
44
Laurence R. Trancredi & Jonathan D. Brodie, The Brain and Behavior: Limitations in the Legal Use of
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 271, 283 (2007).
45
Telephone Interview with Joel Huizenga, supra note 14.
46
Telephone Interview with Steven Laken, Ph.D., president and CEO, Cephos Corp. (Jan. 21, 2009).
47
Id.
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concrete evidence to support the veracity of a witness’s testimony.48 Such evidence
could potentially exonerate innocent defendants in a way that has not been matched since
the inception of DNA evidence. In addition to its desirable accuracy rates and potential
impact as evidence, fMRI testing is highly favored because it is relatively harmless;
“[t]he entire brain can be imaged non-invasively with high resolution and patients are not
exposed to radiation.”49 This makes fMRI testing an ideal candidate for elective use,
perfect for litigants and criminal defendants.
Still, the real test will come when this new form of lie detection science faces the
hurdles of admissibility in court. For Oklahoma, this implicates the same standard
applied to the Federal Rules of Evidence regarding expert testimony and novel science,
the Daubert standard,50 as well as other evidentiary rules and even stigmatic hurdles. The
progressive standard of the Federal Rules is the reason that innovative evidence, such as
unique forms of DNA testing, have been allowed in Oklahoma courts. fMRI, an accurate
and well-tested technology with solid supportive findings, may actually clear the hurdles
to admissibility under Daubert.51
III. Admissibility Under Daubert
Although Oklahoma has followed the federal courts in progressing to a modern,
flexible standard for considering novel scientific evidence, the success of fMRI
technology under this standard will largely depend on Oklahoma’s particular
interpretation of the Daubert analysis and the general attitude of Oklahoma courts toward
48

No Lie MRI, Inc. provides fMRI information and testing to the public. No Lie MRI – Home Page,
http://www.noliemri.com (last visited Feb. 23, 2010). Cephos Corporation is a competitor company also
marketing fMRI testing to the public. Cephos Corp Home Page, http://www.cephoscorp.com (last visited
Feb. 23, 2010).
49
Beth W. Orenstein, Guilty? Investigating fMRI’s Future as a Lie Detector, RADIOLOGY TODAY, May 16,
2005, at 30, available at http://www.radiologytoday.net/archive/rt_051605p30.shtml.
50
Taylor v. State, 1995 OK CR 10, 889 P.2d 319.
51
Wood v. State, 1998 OK CR 19, 959 P.2d 1.
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admitting novel science. This section will explain how the test for reliability in scientific
evidence has changed to allow new advancements. It will also consider how Oklahoma
has applied this standard to recent scientific developments, and discuss the admission or
exclusion of neuroimaging technologies in other jurisdictions.
A. History of the Daubert Standard
Introducing scientific evidence in court is powerful and often confusing, thus
judges guard the admissibility of such evidence to avoid presenting a jury with
information which will not ultimately help it to reach a decision.52 Historically, this gate
keeping duty was much easier for judges to fulfill because they needed only to look to the
currently established beliefs of the scientific community without considering recent
advancements.53 In Frye v. United States, the court’s concise opinion stated the thenwell-known dictum that expert testimony “must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”54 This decision rejected an
early version of polygraph technology, the systolic blood pressure deception test, because
it “had not yet gained such standing and scientific re-cognition among physiological and
psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony
deduced from the discovery, development, and experiments thus far made.”55 This
clearly left no room for the admission of novel science, and for seventy years courts
considered only “well-recognized scientific principle[s] or discovery,”56 even after the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975.57

52

FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
54
Id. at 47.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
53
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When the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted, rule 702 read as following:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise,
if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of
the case.58
This new language requires scientific evidence to be reliable, but nowhere lists any
requirement that the evidence be generally accepted by the scientific community. On its
face, the new rule appears to be a more flexible standard that will allow judges to decide
whether novel evidence is reliable enough to admit in court without reference to whether
it is “sufficiently established” in the scientific community. In 1993, the United States
Supreme Court confirmed that this new standard allows judges to weigh credibility
independently of general acceptance.59
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, the plaintiffs presented evidence of
in vitro and in vivo animals studies suggesting that the drug Bendectin could cause birth
defects.60 Although the plaintiff’s experts were well-credentialed, the District Court
granted summary judgment for the defendant on the grounds that this novel scientific
evidence presented by the experts did not meet the Frye standard of general acceptance.61

58

FED. R. EVID. 702.
Daubert, 509 U.S. 579.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 583.
59
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The Supreme Court considered the inconsistency between Frye and the Federal Rules and
held that “the Frye test was superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.”62 The Court then set out a framework for judges to follow in fulfilling the
new “gate-keeping responsibility” proscribed by the Federal Rules.
The Court specifically stated that they were not creating a “definitive checklist or
test,”63 and the decision has been properly interpreted as creating discretionary and nonexhaustive guidelines.64 Daubert provides a two-step analysis: first, whether the
evidence is reliable when considering four factors that addressed the credibility of the
science, and second, whether the evidence is relevant to the facts.65 The first factor to
consider under the reliability prong of the test is whether the evidence has been tested,
focusing specifically on its falsifiability, meaning whether the science could be proven
false.66 Under the second factor, the Court discussed publication and peer review, which
would increase chance that an erroneous method has been scrutinized or refuted.67
However, the Court stated that a lack of publication was not dispositive because some
reliable advancements are worthwhile but too new to yet be published at the time they are
offered in court.68 This is because publication can often take several years.69 Under the
third factor, the Court discussed the error rate of the new technique or method, focusing
on the amount of control used in reaching a conclusion.70 A specific minimum error rate
is not stated however, as the jury merely needs to have a basis for assessing how much
62

Id. at 587.
Id. at 592.
64
Andrew B. Gagen, What Is an Environmental Expert? The Impact of Daubert, Joiner and Kumho Tire on
the Admissibility of Scientific Expert Evidence, 19 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 401, 408 (2002).
65
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93.
66
Id. at 593.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Telephone Interview with Steven Laken, supra note 46.
70
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
63
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weight to give the evidence ultimately.71 Under the fourth factor, the Court returned to
the science’s acceptance in the scientific community, stating that although this is not
required it is still relevant in deciding whether a novel science is credible.72 All of these
factors are weighed together when the judge evaluates the reliability of the science.73 It is
important to remember that “[t]he focus, of course, must be solely on principles and
methodology, not the conclusions that they generate.”74 A proper Daubert analysis will
focus on the process without being influenced by feasibility of the results produced.75
Oklahoma first adopted this progressive and flexible standard in Taylor v. State,
which considered the admission of DNA evidence as a matter of first impression in
Oklahoma.76 Oklahoma Evidence Code section 2702 was adopted to govern expert
testimony; it was identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, except that at the time of its
adoption it did not list specific factors for considering reliability: “If scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”77 It has
since been amended to mirror the Federal Rules. When the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals confronted the issue of novel science, it held that “the time is right for this court
to abandon the Frye test and adopt the more structured and yet flexile admissibility
standard set forth in Daubert.”78 The court stated that this new standard provided more

71

Id.
Id.
73
Gagen, supra note 64, at 409.
74
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.
75
Gagen, supra note 64, at 412.
76
Taylor v. State, 1995 OK CR 10, 889 P.2d 319.
77
12 OKLA. STAT. § 2702 (1981).
78
Taylor, ¶ 15, 889 P.2d at 328.
72
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“structure and guidance” for what had previously been a confusing analysis, and that it
would more properly consider the language of the Oklahoma Evidence Code.79
The Taylor court also made a point to address the standard of review for
specifically novel scientific evidence under Daubert. In the past, Oklahoma had asserted
an abuse of discretion standard, but had nevertheless “conducted extensive, independent
review of novel scientific evidentiary material in determining whether the trial judges’
decision admitting or excluding it was proper.”80 The court held that the standard of
review for such evidence should be de novo, rather than a review “limited by deference to
the trial judge’s discretion.”81 In this aspect, Oklahoma courts differ from federal courts.
This difference may have great impact on fMRI evidence, as it presents far more
opportunity for the appellate court in Oklahoma to reconsider the reliability of new
scientific evidence than a circuit court or another jurisdiction which follows the federal
standard of review.
Essentially, Oklahoma Evidence Code section 2702, and those like it, allow the
use of “scientific evidence” in court. The Daubert decision then provides the criteria for
assessing whether evidence is truly “scientific”.82 Each of the Daubert factors is
fundamentally a means to evaluate accuracy and reproducibility, which in science is the
systematic basis for scientific credibility.83 Clearly, an inquiry into accuracy rates and
controls is an assessment of accuracy; an appraisal of the testing, publication, peer-review
process and acceptance within the relevant scientific field is an effort to make certain that

79

Id. ¶ 16, 889 P.2d at 329.
Id. ¶ 22, 889 P.2d at 331.
81
Id. ¶ 22, 889 P.2d at 331-32.
82
“[I]n a case involving scientific evidence, evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific validity.”
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993).
83
Telephone Interview with Joel Huizenga, supra note 14.
80
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others have achieved the same results, and that if they did not, this discrepancy has been
exposed. If performed objectively, a Daubert analysis merely reinforces the integrity of
the scientific method when admitting science as evidence.
B. Novel Science in Oklahoma
Taylor’s admittance of DNA evidence was Oklahoma’s first indication of a
preference toward admitting novel science under the Daubert standard.84 Taylor
addressed the first prong of Daubert by considering the four factors of reliability. First,
the court noted that DNA theory and techniques could be and were at that time tested in
numerous studies.85 Second, the court noted that these techniques had been subjected to
peer review in several instances and that no article had discredited the DNA techniques
presented.86 Third, the court considered the rate of error of DNA matching and the
“series of quality control steps” taken during this process.87 The court mentioned that
although no exact figure was given for a potential rate of error, evidence suggested that it
was extremely unlikely that a mistake in testing would result in an incorrect finding of
DNA match, or false positive, but rather would produce no result at all.88 Fourth, the
court returned to the general acceptance of DNA matching found in the record, which
further supported the court’s holding that this technique for DNA profiling was
“sufficiently reliable to have warranted admission.”89 Finally, the court considered the
second prong of Daubert, finding that DNA profiling was relevant to the facts of the
case.90 Although the Court did not approach the reliability factors as a checklist, its
84

Id.
Taylor, ¶ 24, 889 P.2d at 333.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id. ¶ 25, 889 P.2d at 334.
85
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decision does not necessarily show a more lenient analysis of expert testimony because
all four factors were easily met, including a finding of general acceptance, which would
have allowed the evidence in under the Frye standard.91 Nevertheless, the court did
accept evidence of possible error in the process; there was sufficient testimony at the
hearing that the procedure employed adequate controls and that DNA profiling was
highly accurate, but this testimony did not suggest the method was perfect.92
In Wood v. State, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals faced a similar issue
of first impression regarding a new development in DNA matching known as the PCR
method. After review, the court also found that this evidence met the Daubert standard.93
Reviewing the trial court’s Daubert analysis, the court noted that (1) the new methods
had been tested, (2) the methods had been peer-reviewed, (3) evidence of a sufficient
error rate had been presented, and (4) several other jurisdictions had admitted evidence of
the PCR method of DNA testing by finding that it was generally accepted within the
scientific community.94
This decision is similar to Taylor in that it admitted another novel scientific
method under Daubert, and yet did not confront a situation where several factors were
fulfilled while one was found lacking.95 Similar to Taylor, the novel science considered
in Wood was a matter of first impression in Oklahoma, thus subjecting it to section 2702,
but the method had been found by other jurisdictions to be generally accepted.96 Both of
these cases suggest that Oklahoma is willing to admit novel science, but do not
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necessarily imply that Oklahoma will be more lenient under Daubert than it was under
Frye, or that it will admit evidence so new that it is deficient under one of the reliability
factors.
A different type of science was considered by Oklahoma under a Daubert analysis
in Gilson v. State in 2000.97 In this case, the court reviewed a theory used by Dr. Wanda
Draper to determine whether children who were subject to abuse were competent to be
witnesses at trial.98 Here, the trial court did not accept the doctor’s method as reliable
after a Daubert analysis, and the exclusion of this evidence was under review.99 The
court held that there was no error in excluding the evidence, and discussed three of the
Daubert factors.100 First, the court noted that there was no testimony that this method of
assessing the competence of children could or had been tested.101 The court made no
mention of publication or peer review, but noted secondly that no evidence had been
presented that this method was generally accepted in the child development field.102
Lastly, the court discusses several reasons why there could be significant error with Dr.
Draper’s assessment, including the fact that the children had only been interviewed once,
and that incorrect interview techniques could have greatly affected the children.103 These
unmonitored variables reflected inadequate controls. The court’s decision did not need to
include a discussion of all four factors once an analysis of three factors led to the
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conclusion that the method was unreliable, because the Daubert analysis is appropriately
applied as a flexible standard of balancing guidelines, and not as a checklist.104
This decision provides some insight on what will render a novel method
unreliable under section 2702 in Oklahoma. The court did not consider every factor, but
did find that three of the four conveyed unreliability, holding that the method did not
survive the Daubert standard. Still, when the court examined the record for evidence of
these factors during the hearing it found no evidence to support reliability.105 This does
not provide a clear understanding of how the court would rule if evidence was present in
the record but minimal - or contradictory - regarding only one of the reliability factors.
Another situation was presented in Christian v. Gray, in which the trial court
excluded the expert evidence of lung damage due to a lack of pre-injury spirometry
testing (a measure of lung function).106 This case exemplifies the standard of review
applied in Oklahoma when reviewing a Daubert decision on the admissibility of
scientific evidence.107 The trial court attempted a Daubert analysis regarding the expert’s
finding that damage was due to chemical exposure by the defendant, but stated that a
main reason for denying admissibility was “because the expert did not possess ‘baseline
data’ of Plaintiff’s pulmonary functions prior to Plaintiff’s exposure.”108 However, the
court does not find in the record that this baseline test was considered necessary by others
in the field in order for the expert’s findings to be credible.109 The trial court’s desire for
evidence of a “baseline” test for lung function before the alleged injury savors strongly of
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the focus on “controls” in Daubert, but the record never clearly states this rationale as
part of a Daubert analysis and the appellate court does not appear to acknowledge this
possible connection. As a result, the appellate court holds that the exclusion of the expert
evidence was erroneous because evidence of a baseline test is not “one of the particular
Daubert factors, or some other factor determined to be appropriate in applying
Daubert.”110 Still, the court specifically states that their decision did not determine that
the expert evidence necessarily satisfied Daubert; rather, the record merely presented this
as an improper exclusion that failed appellate review and rendered the trial court’s order
unenforceable.111
This case illustrates Oklahoma’s interpretation of the requirements of a trial
court’s Daubert analysis under section 2702, and the circumstances that could amount to
erroneous exclusion. Where, as in this case, the exclusion is based on an assumed fact or
other basis outside the exact Daubert criteria, an Oklahoma appellate court might
overturn the decision, even when the reason could liberally be construed as part of a
Daubert factor. This may suggest a hesitancy to exclude a science when the trial court
applies strict or inflexible standards for accuracy.
Gilson and Christian are similar to Wood and Taylor in that these decisions
confront novel science where the evidence regarding reliability is strongly weighted
toward one extreme or the other. These cases fail to provide a definite prediction of how
Oklahoma courts will rule when there is an even mix of factors that suggest reliability
and factors that suggest the method or science is unreliable. Nevertheless, the decisions
of Taylor and Wood, as well as the requirement that an exclusion be made consistent with
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Daubert factors, would seem to suggest a warm welcome to competent novel science.
When Oklahoma overturned the decision of the Daubert hearing on the appeal in
Christian, it was because the science was inappropriately excluded, not inappropriately
admitted.112 The court’s reaction to what was possibly a stringent accuracy argument in
Christian may alleviate some of the concern over an inordinately severe rate of error
requirement for neuroimaging evidence. Because fMRI does in fact display evidence of
reliability under several other factors, and this evidence will only be strengthened by the
time it is offered as evidence in Oklahoma, the court should perform a straightforward
Daubert analysis and accept it despite other issues, such as an aversion to futuristic
technology or a section 2403 analysis, discussed infra.
C. Neuroimaging Technology in Court
Although at the time of this writing no case directly addresses fMRI deception
detection under Daubert,113 two criminal defendants have attempted to admit the liedetection-related technology of “brain fingerprinting” in post-conviction proceedings,
one of which occurred in Oklahoma.114 Although this technology is fundamentally
different than fMRI in both theory and application, and therefore should not be compared
to fMRI, this case does at least provide some understanding of how section 2702 may be
applied to novel neuroscience. In 2005, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
reviewed brain fingerprinting, though the decision leaves the issue of admitting
neuroimaging technologies disappointingly speculative.115 In Slaughter v. State, the
petitioner appealed his conviction based on the “novel science” of brain fingerprinting,
112

Christian v. Gray, 2003 OK 10, ¶ 49, 65 P.3d 591, 610.
A 2009 search of Westlaw and LexisNexis revealed no case law for fMRI evidence of this particular
application.
114
Slaughter v. State, 2005 OK CR 2,105 P.3d 832.
115
Id.
113

20

which he argued should be admitted for post-conviction relief because it was not
available at the time of his trial.116 In this case, brain fingerprinting entailed a brain scan
during which the petitioner was asked about the details of the crime, and where the scan
results showed that his brain did not contain information which a guilty party’s brain
would contain.117
The court attempted to conduct a thorough Daubert analysis of the reliability of
brain fingerprinting, but was unfortunately thwarted by an unprepared and unreliable
expert.118 The court noted that Dr. Farwell, the expert presenting this evidence, provided
an affidavit that would appear at first to satisfy the four reliability factors: (1) he claimed
that brain fingerprinting is extensively tested, (2) recognized by peer review and
published, (3) accurate with a very low error rate, and (4) is generally accepted by those
in the scientific community dealing specifically with neuroimaging advancement.119
Nevertheless, the court stated that it could not find brain fingerprinting reliable because
the claims were “not supported by anything other than [Dr. Farwell’s] bare affidavit.”120
This affidavit promised the court a comprehensive report, providing details about the
procedure, yet after six months the court received neither any such report, nor any
explanation for its absence.121 The court also noted a 2001 report that found the
technique behind brain fingerprinting had not been well tested or peer reviewed, and that
it was not generally accepted.122 The court’s consideration of this dated report was not
practical as doing so disregarded how much critique within the scientific community can
116
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develop in a span of five years, particularly with novel technology. Ultimately however,
the court held that the claims in Dr. Farwell’s affidavit were “unconvincing, and more
importantly, legally insufficient” for admittance under Daubert.123
Regrettably, the court should have had the opportunity to consider suitable
verifications of testing, peer review and error rates, but was unable to do so because of
poor participation by the expert involved. The language of this opinion calls Dr.
Farwell’s claims “interesting,” “startling” and “unconvincing,”124 and makes the mental
leap that “[t]he failure to provide such evidence to support the claims raised can lead to
no other conclusion . . . but that such evidence does not exist.”125 Still, this decision did
not directly denounce the possibility of neuroimaging technologies satisfying Daubert. It
merely held that the expert in this particular case provided insufficient material to support
his claims. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals decided this case in 2005, and
partially in reference to a critical report from 2001, which in the neuroimaging field
would have rendered it outdated if not obsolete. For fMRI evidence offered in the future,
the few years that have passed since Slaughter will have generated an ever-increasing
number of published studies and expert reviews, and possibly more general acceptance of
such technology by scientists and judges alike. Also, fMRI is a fundamentally different
technology than brain fingerprinting and is considered to be the imaging technology of
choice,126 and arguably the best candidates for admittance in court. By disallowing brain
fingerprinting to be admitted merely on grounds that the expert failed to supply the
comprehensive report, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals left open the possibility
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that a reliable neuroimaging deception detection technology, such as fMRI, could
successfully present more concrete evidence of credibility and gain admittance.
The Daubert court made a point to explain that the reliability factors were not
intended to be used as a checklist; one factor could be insufficient in supporting
reliability - such as when a new science has not been yet published at the time it is
offered in court - and yet by balancing all factors the weight of the evidence could still
support reliability.127 However, most Oklahoma cases reviewing a Daubert analysis do
not present technologies where some factors suggest the science is highly reliable and
others suggest the science is unreliable, so it is uncertain how Oklahoma courts will
address a novel science with mixed evidence of reliability. Most novel science examined
in Oklahoma falls clearly to either side of the Daubert line. Due to the stricter standard
with which judges may view novel neuroscience, it is possible – though not especially
likely - that fMRI evidence presented in Oklahoma will be highly scrutinized under one
or more factors. This may present a less obvious prediction for rulings in Oklahoma
courts, but will not preclude fMRI deception detection evidence from surviving an
objective Daubert test.
D. Neuroimaging in Other Jurisdictions
A few other jurisdictions have had encounters with brain fingerprinting and fMRI
evidence for applications other than deception detection, yet none have included in their
opinions any language that would clarify the likelihood of admitting such technology
under Daubert. In Harrington v. State, the Supreme Court of Iowa examined evidence of
brain fingerprinting in an application for post-conviction relief.128 Nevertheless, the court
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dispensed with the case on a due process issue, thus avoiding any analysis of the
reliability of the brain fingerprinting evidence.129
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Idaho examined a claim of ineffective counsel
which argued that the attorney should have subjected the defendant to fMRI procedures
in order to identify a mental abnormality.130 However, this application of fMRI imaging
was a wholly separate theory from the science of fMRI of deception detection. Again,
the court ignored the issue of novel science by stating that the counsel’s strategy and
methods were not ineffective.131
A series of First Amendment cases involving the Entertainment Software
Association presented fMRI evidence in the Northern District of Illinois and the Eastern
District of Michigan in 2005, and the District of Minnesota in 2006.132 These cases
offered fMRI evidence, not for deception detection, but rather to demonstrate the effects
of violent video games on an adolescent brain.133 Entertainment Software Association et
al. v. Blagojevich provides a lengthy discussion of fMRI evidence.134 Although the
procedure measured blood flow to the brain similar to fMRI deception detection, the
theory of the procedure differed completely; it related to inhibiting impulses, which
diverges greatly from the study of the BOLD effect in different neural regions.135 The
court did not do a full Daubert analysis, but did discuss peer review and publication of
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the method at issue, as well as the possibility of error in the results.136 In discussing the
error rate, the court found the evidence unpersuasive based on a lack of control for the
variables in the procedure,137 but after this conclusion the court gave no further analysis
of the science.
In Entm’t Software Ass’n et all v. Hatch, the court mentions fMRI studies of
violence effects on the brain, but finds that the evidence is neither convincing nor
relevant enough to even warrant a Daubert analysis.138 Likewise, in the third case,
Entm’t Software Ass’n et all v. Granholm, the court briefly discusses the fMRI studies
offered, but disregards these studies after only “[a] cursory review of the research,” and
never applies any Daubert reliability factors.139
Although some of the above cases consider the reliability of fMRI, none present
case law which considers fMRI evidence for deception detection. The procedure for
assessing the effects of video games is fundamentally different than that for deception
detection140 and in the few years that have passed since these cases were decided the
accuracy and techniques of fMRI have greatly increased so that any earlier analysis of
reliability is no longer relevant. The decisions do share the common theme of avoiding
any detailed analysis of reliability, and this possibly reflects a judicial attitude that the
foremost neuroimaging technologies are not even well-grounded enough to warrant
analysis in court. Or perhaps these courts recognize that such technologies were
presented before they had matured enough to withstand the appropriate tests, and the
judges simply wished to set them aside for a later court when such evidence is more
136
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likely to withstand Daubert and where future judges are more accustomed to assessing
technological advancements. In either case, no opinion that has considered fMRI
evidence, even briefly, has considered the admission of this science for its ability to
detect deception. Thus, this dicta can have no real impact on any future analysis of the
science, even as persuasive support.141 Ultimately, the sparse case law history leaves a
relatively blank canvas for a decision in Oklahoma regarding the admissibility of fMRI
deception detection evidence.
IV. A Daubert Analysis of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging
FMRI deception detection technology may be new and quite incredible, but from
a strictly black-letter standpoint it is highly likely that fMRI will satisfy the Daubert
prongs of relevance and reliability. This section will first discuss the likelihood of
fMRI’s admissibility under the Daubert reliability factors: testing, peer review and
publication, rate of error, and general acceptance by the scientific community. This
section will also discuss why fMRI will pass the second prong: relevance to the case.
A. Testing
The first factor Daubert discusses for analyzing reliability is “whether the [novel
science] can be (and has been) tested.”142 The Court goes further and states that a
primary focus should be on whether the technique or method can be falsified or
refuted.143 Although fMRI deception detection is quite new, there have been around
twenty studies by well-recognized companies and academic institutions, and more studies
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will be conducted each year.144 Langleben’s initial “guilty knowledge” study, completed
in 2001 and published in 2002, tested subjects with playing cards and revealed that “there
is a neurophysiological difference between deception and truth at the brain activation
level that can be detected with fMRI.”145 Another 2001 study, by rival fMRI researcher
Sean Spence, M.D., discovered “lying (relative to truth) was associated with greater
activity in bilateral ventrolateral prefrontal cortices” when subjects were asked “yes” or
“no” questions, and truth produced no increased activity.146 A 2002 study similarly
discovered that “feigned memory impairment . . . revealed four principle (sic) regions of
brain activation: prefrontal and frontal, parietal, temporal, and sub-cortical.”147
A 2003 study further investigated the theory by comparing memorized lies as part
of a “coherent story” to “spontaneous lies” and found that while spontaneous lies created
the most activation, both types of lies caused more activation than the truth state.148 In
2004, F. Andrew Kozel, M.D., published two studies, one which compared individual to
group results, and another which attempted to replicate past findings and confirmed the
method of fMRI deception detection as “reasonable.”149 A trio of 2005 studies focused on
applying fMRI to “single deceptive and truthful responses in individual subjects,” rather
than group data.150 Two more studies were published in 2005, one of which concluded
that more activation was present during false responses regarding personal information,
and another which aimed to “evoke performance anxiety about generating lies” in an
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attempt to more closely simulate a practical application.151 In 2006 two articles were
published on a collaborative study which supported past conclusions and also aimed to
“create a more ‘real life’ experience than traditional analog studies.”152 This study
involved subjects either shooting a gun or being falsely identified on surveillance footage
to create emotional stimuli, and a financial incentive to lie successfully which attempted
to replicate a realistic motivation to be believed.153 In 2007 a study utilized positron
emission tomography, a method of measuring neural activity through electrical charges,
to corroborate the fMRI findings which suggested increased activity during deception in
several pre-frontal sub-regions of the brain, including the left dorsolateral, right anterior
and ventromedial prefrontal cortices.154 The most recently released study is from
January, 2009.155 This study again addresses concerns that fMRI testing has been too
isolated should employ real world scenarios.156 Here, a mock crime group stole and
damage compact disks containing incriminating footage before undergoing fMRI
testing.157
An article in the American Journal of Law and Medicine discussed the National
Institute of Health’s ongoing initiative for major research groups that would share and
compare fMRI test results from twenty-six different institutions,158 which aims to
minimize variability and ensure uniform results.159 The tests will compare multiple
procedures with one individual using a single fMRI unit, as well as one individual being
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tested in different fMRI facilities.160 The comparison of these studies will help confirm
that fMRI technology is reproducible and has not been falsified or refuted. Because
fMRI deception detection is such a recent and quickly-advancing technology, it will
assuredly attract even further testing and study by well recognized researchers before it
faces a Daubert analysis in court. Huizenga confirms that No Lie MRI, Inc., has funded a
number of studies which further investigate and refine deception detection, and that these
studies are either ongoing or have yet to emerge from the peer review and publication
process.161 Similarly, Laken will soon be publishing new material that assesses the
effects that fatigue and decreased motivation for accuracy may have on fMRI
accuracy.162
In prior decisions which applied section 2702, Oklahoma appellate courts held
that minimal discussion of the testing factor would suffice for a proper Daubert analysis,
only noting that it was apparent to the trial court through testimony that the science in
question had and could be tested.163 When the court rejected a scientific method under
section 2702 there was no evidence of testing in the record.164 This does not suggest an
especially strenuous standard. Based both on the plentiful testing that fMRI deception
detection has already undergone, as well as the certainty that such testing will increase in
both volume and detail before a decision in Oklahoma court, it is extremely likely that
fMRI will be held reliable under the testing factor, weighing strongly in favor of
admission under Daubert.
160
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B. Peer Review and Publication
The second factor the Daubert court considered in deciding reliability is whether
the novel science has been peer reviewed and published.165 Nevertheless, the Court
specifically states that peer review and publication “does not necessarily correlate with
reliability,” acknowledging that some sciences may be too new for publication at the time
they are admitted in court, but will still present accurate and meaningful evidence.166 The
Daubert court believed publication was an important consideration because peer-review
of a novel science allows greater opportunity for a faulty method or theory to be refuted
or criticized.167
For fMRI evidence, despite being a very young science, publication and peer
review should not prove to be a difficult hurdle. Currently, results from numerous fMRI
studies as well as in depth discussions of the process behind this technology have been
published in a wide selection of peer-reviewed medical and legal journals.168 These
articles specifically consider the theory, methods, and accuracy in reference to possible
application in court.169 More importantly, however, no articles to date have been
published which refute fMRI deception detection technology or claim an unacceptable
accuracy rate.170 The amount of critical analysis available on this technology certainly
appease the Daubert court’s concern that once published and peer reviewed, flaws in the
methods or theory of a faulty science are more likely to be revealed.171 The fact that this
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criticism has not occurred with fMRI deception detection strongly supports the
reproducibility and validity of these results.
In Oklahoma, courts have allowed novel science to satisfy the factor of peer
review with a minimal showing.172 In Taylor, the record showed no peer reviewed
articles that had discredited the science in question, and in Wood the court merely
accepted at face value testimony that the DNA method had been peer reviewed.173
Although it is possible that an article may be published which refutes fMRI technology in
some way before fMRI evidence is offered in court, this is extremely unlikely as there is
currently no controversy over the legitimacy of the science beyond slightly differing
accuracy rates or the types of studies performed.174 There is certainly enough publication
by peer reviewed journals on fMRI technology and methods to satisfy this factor as it has
been discussed thus far in Oklahoma. Therefore, a consideration of peer review and
publication should also weigh heavily in favor of holding that fMRI is a reliable science.
C. Rate of Error
The third factor the Daubert court considered was “the known or potential rate of
error.”175 The Court further stated that the standards of control for the procedure should
be considered.176 However, the Daubert court never specifies a statistic that would
necessarily satisfy the error rate factor.177 Considering the error rate of other types of
admissible evidence is no more helpful in determining a minimum error rate because
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many well accepted types of evidence display relatively low accuracy. Nevertheless, it is
still possible that a novel science which is not well understood (or even feared) by the
court may be held to a stricter standard with regard to error rate.178 This is perhaps the
most controversial factor due to inconsistencies between the low error rate expected from
a science hoping to pass Daubert and the high error rates reported for certain longaccepted types of evidence.179 For example, eyewitness testimony is frequently
inaccurate because of faulty memory, stress and a phenomenon called unconscious
transference.180 These problems explain why eyewitness testimony is arguably the
number one source of wrongful conviction.181 Still, eyewitness testimony remains a well
accepted and compelling form of evidence in American courtrooms under the assumption
that such evidence may help the jury even if it is not one hundred percent accurate.182
Similarly, fingerprinting methods, another established source of evidence in
courtrooms, have recently been questioned for not being subjected to the same standard
of analysis as other sciences, and because certain methods are not supported by known
error rates.183 In Oklahoma, Stacy v. State discussed and admitted fingerprinting
evidence in 1930.184 However, this was long before Oklahoma courts incorporated the
Daubert analysis into their assessment of the reliability of scientific evidence.185
Although the Stacy decision considered the amount of published work on fingerprinting
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and the number of other jurisdictions with laws requiring fingerprinting in certain
situations, the decision makes no mention of error rate.186 Despite the later adoption of
Daubert, this precedent for admitting scientific evidence with a relatively high or
unknown error rate has produced unresolved inconsistencies.
In Oklahoma, the decisions involving a Daubert analysis present only a minimal
discussion of error rate. The Taylor court accepted DNA analysis after testimony that the
company’s work was submitted to a blind test which ensured that proper procedures were
followed, despite a lack of figures regarding a known or potential rate of error.187 This
conveys an appropriate focus on control rather than merely what percentage should be
met for an acceptable error rate. Still, the Court mentioned that an error would be more
likely to produce no result than an incorrect result, which addresses the concern of
wrongful convictions based on extremely persuasive but inaccurate evidence.188 Later,
the Wood decision again accepted testimony that the rate of error for the new method of
DNA analysis was acceptable and the laboratory had undergone proficiency testing to
guarantee proper control and procedure.189 These cases suggest that the showing required
to satisfy the rate of error factor in Oklahoma would not be especially stringent or
inflexible.
In cases where Oklahoma has not found an acceptable error rate, the decision was
not due to a listed error rate being insufficient, but rather due to a complete absence of
error rate evidence or a complete lack of baseline control. In Gilson, the court approved
exclusion under Daubert because an error rate was not listed, and because the method of
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using a single interview with multiple human variables presented by the interviewer did
not maintain adequate controls and inherently suggested high probability of error.190
Christian similarly presents a liberal interpretation of acceptable error rate. Here, the
appellate court overturns the trial court’s decision to exclude the evidence because it
lacked a “baseline” lung assessment, holding that a pre-injury test for comparison was not
compulsory.191 This is significant because a pre-injury test would seem to fall under the
genre of controls. Thus, holding that the trial court erred by applying too rigorous a
standard for adequate controls conveys that Oklahoma courts may have a more relaxed
expectation for control and accuracy.
One of the largest studies on the accuracy of fMRI revealed a 7 - 10% error rate,
which is considered impressive for an emerging science.192 Other studies have produced
even lower rates of error when fMRI is used to test the basic question of true or false,
some as accurate as 99%.193 Laken is currently promoting 97% accuracy for Cephos
Corporation, and expects improvement.194 This figure is a product of studies performed
at his facility and reviewed at the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center, in
Dallas.195 Similarly, Huizenga states that No Lie MRI, Inc. will soon be promoting
accuracy rates of 95%.196 This is a more cautious figure, but Huizenga qualifies that as a
product of the current studies the accuracy rate should rise to 99% in three to ten years.197
99% accuracy is extremely significant because for methods such as fMRI testing, perfect
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accuracy is - in theory under the Heisenberg uncertainty principle - impossible.198
Although there are still problems with fMRI, the techniques for deception detection are
continually improving.199
Another consideration under Daubert is the controls and standards for the
science.200 This is an area where fMRI will fare well, because so little of the process is
performed by humans. A computer presents a question to which the subject responds,
and advanced computer software receives the answer and analyzes the results.201
Although MRI machines are run and monitored by humans, the test is essentially an
autopilot function without the presence of an examiner; the analysis and conclusions are
entirely the result of the algorithmic computer programs, which provide high spatial
resolution.202 This computerized aspect places fMRI testing in a whole different class of
control than most other types of evidence which use human interpretation to reach results,
such as fingerprinting and even, to an extent, DNA sequencing. Commentators have
noted that this “reduced risk of human fallibility associated with . . . fMRI tests” will
increase the likelihood that fMRI is considered reliable by courts where polygraph testing
was found insufficient.203
Furthermore, the open source software for fMRI testing is refined every few
years, and Laken expects these advancements to continue.204 Laken also anticipates
additional improvements in the algorithmic equations employed to interpret fMRI data,
198
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which will further increase accuracy.205 As both the scanning technology and analyzing
software continue to progress before fMRI technology is offered in court, the amount of
effective control in the procedure will certainly weigh heavily in favor of the reliability of
this technology.
The current fMRI deception detection studies have been producing differing rates
of error, but in general these error rates are relatively low.206 There is also a general
expectation that the technology will improve until it reaches an error rate of near zero.207
If fMRI deception detection were presented in Oklahoma court today, it is extremely
likely that the accuracy rates presented, generally above 90%, would be sufficient for the
court to consider the technology reliable.208 Moreover, as the accuracy of fMRI
deception detection continually improves, the chances of this technology satisfying the
error rate factor will likewise continually improve. Thus, if it is not subject to Daubert
until several years from now it will certainly take more than a criticism of accuracy to
exclude this evidence. Overall, the increasingly low error rate of fMRI deception
detection will strongly encourage Oklahoma courts to find this technology reliable.
D. General Acceptance
The final factor the Daubert court discusses when deciding on the reliability of
novel science is the general acceptance the science has gained within the scientific
community.209 This is a direct reference to the earlier Frye standard that the Court has
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incorporated into the Daubert analysis,210 yet in the current analysis it will no longer be
dispositive, but will be weighed alongside the other three factors.211 The Court states that
although general acceptance is no longer an ultimate standard, “a known technique which
has been able to attract only minimal support within the community. . . may properly be
viewed with skepticism.”212
In Oklahoma, the Taylor court held that it was “abundantly clear” that the DNA
methods in question had been generally accepted by the relevant scientific community,
based on the testimony of two experts.213 In Wood, the court reached the same
conclusion, but felt the general acceptance factor had necessarily been satisfied because
numerous other jurisdictions had found the PCR method to be generally accepted within
the scientific community.214 These two cases consider different standards for general
acceptance while reaching a similar conclusion. Wood describes a situation where the
science has been admitted in other jurisdictions and the court may look to other
assessments of general acceptance. Conversely, Taylor suggests that Oklahoma may be
willing to find general acceptance of the novel science in question based only on the
testimony of experts that such general acceptance exists. The Gilson decision does not
appear to suggest an especially difficult hurdle to finding general acceptance either, since
this court found no evidence at all in the record to support general acceptance in the
applicable field when holding that the method was not generally accepted. None of these
cases discussed general acceptance in depth once some evidence of acceptance was
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presented, so perhaps a mere statement by credible experts that fMRI deception detection
is generally accepted would suffice.
Experts do have differing opinions over the accuracy and advanced capabilities of
fMRI technology regarding deception detection, yet it is generally accepted within the
neuroimaging community that drawing conclusions based on correlations between
activity in certain neural regions and deception is a valid science.215 The sheer number of
leading research groups who are developing and standardizing fMRI deception detection
speaks to the growth of its acceptance.216 Although Oklahoma cases which consider
general acceptance in a Daubert analysis have not discussed a situation where evidence is
presented to both establishe and refute general acceptance, a credible showing of fMRI
acceptance within at least the specific area of neuroimaging advancement would likely be
sufficient to weigh in favor of reliability as a whole in a Daubert analysis.
E. Relevance of Novel Science
The second prong of Daubert considered whether the novel science “properly can
be applied to the facts in issue,”217 although the court does not discuss this element in
length. This prong is effectively an assessment of relevance. The Taylor court merely
mentions this prong - stating that the science must assist the jury - and finds that DNA
matching is clearly relevant to determining whether the defendant was guilty of rape.218
The Wood court does not discuss this prong at all in their review of the trial court’s
Daubert analysis.219 In regards to the instant situation, it is key to remember that the
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credibility of testimony is always relevant. Because fMRI results which support or
discredit the credibility of testimony will certainly be relevant to fact finding, meeting the
relevance prong will not be an issue.
Ultimately, fMRI evidence should prove admissible in Oklahoma courts under a
true Daubert analysis. Although there is some concern that courts may apply the
reliability factors as a checklist and disallow a novel science when only one factor does
not support reliability, the Daubert decision specifically cautioned against this.220 None
of the Oklahoma cases reviewing a Daubert analysis consider this specific situation, but
neither does the language in these cases suggest such a “checklist” approach would be
taken. The language suggests that a reasonable amount of evidence from credible sources
which supports reliability will result in the admissibility of expert evidence, and that
Oklahoma courts are willing to embrace novel science. fMRI deception detection
technology currently has much support from academics who praise its accuracy and
reliability, and because fMRI is an area of high interest in the neuro-imaging community
the research and effort behind its development will continue as more funding becomes
available.221 This should provide sufficient weight under each of the reliability factors.
Even if one factor demonstrates less reliability than the others, a balance of the factors
together should still be sufficient to hold fMRI reliable in a true interpretation of
Daubert. Section 2702 merely requires specialized evidence to be scientifically reliable,
which means that it must be accurate and reproducible.222 As Steven Morese, J.D., Ph. D.
optimistically states, “[i]f neuroscientific evidence is specifically relevant in an individual
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case, as Daubert requires, and it is based on competent science, it will be admitted.”223
Thus, it is highly probable that if fMRI evidence is offered in Oklahoma courts it will
succeed under Oklahoma Evidence Code section 2702, and likely that a similar result will
be reached in the Tenth Circuit under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
VI. Other Admissibility Hurdles
Although fMRI deception detection demonstrates adequate scientific reliability to
recommend admission under a true Daubert analysis, there are several other issues that
may prove detrimental to admission in Oklahoma courts. The possibility of evidence that
proposes to visually interpret a person’s thoughts raises questions of jury confusion,
overreaching influence, social stigmas regarding “mind reading” technology, and even an
elimination of the jury completely. This section will discuss admissibility hurdles under
Oklahoma Evidence Code section 2403, the concern that fMRI technology invades the
province of the jury and the possible influence of a societal aversion to fMRI on judges.
This section will conclude by mentioning several other relevant issues that cannot be
discussed fully in this comment, but may develop once fMRI evidence is admitted.
A. Oklahoma Evidence Code Section 2403
Chief Judge Gibson of the Eighth Circuit wrote that if lie detection evidence is
admitted in court “it is likely to be shrouded with an aura of near infallibility, akin to the
ancient oracle of Delphi.”224 Ironically, the reputation for “near infallibility” that fMRI
researchers are promoting may also prove a detriment to its admittance. One of the most
difficult evidentiary obstacles that fMRI deception detection evidence may face is section
2403, which governs the admittance of evidence which is relevant, but perhaps
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inadmissible because of another overwhelming concern, usually that it is too
influential.225 Oklahoma Evidence Code section 2403 states: “Although relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, needless
presentation of cumulative evidence, or unfair and harmful surprise . . . .”226 This rule is
nearly identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which was discussed in Daubert, as
well as many other cases that consider the admission of novel science.227 Specifically,
“undue prejudice,” “confusion of the issues” and “misleading the jury” are grounds on
which fMRI might be ruled inadmissible.228
One concern judges may have is that jurors will overvalue evidence from an
impressive new lie detection technology and accept these results as conclusive, despite
cross-examination regarding possible error.229 In United States v. Scheffer, the United
States Supreme Court recognized this inherent issue as applied to traditional polygraph
evidence, fearing the “risk that juries will give excessive weight to the opinions of a
polygrapher . . . .”230 The Tenth Circuit recognized the same issue in United States v.
Call, noting that the scientific nature of lie detection procedures may cause the jury to
overvalue this evidence.231 Judges will likely have the same concerns when considering
fMRI evidence.
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Moreover, there are certain aspects of fMRI evidence that would make this
concern even more compelling, such as the impact that vivid high-resolution images
which illustrate an individual’s neural activity will have on the jury .232 Such brightly
visualized images may create a false sense of familiarity with the science, which
increases the undue prejudice of the scientific evidence.233 In an interview regarding the
potential for fMRI images, 60 Minutes correspondent Lesley Stahl commented on this
influence, stating that “[w]hen you show someone a brain scan people just believe it. It
reeks of credibility.”234 Many scholars believe this is exactly what happened in the John
Hinckley trial: despite testimony by a radiologist who refuted the basis of the defense’s
argument, the jury was over-awed by evidence of a CT scan and improperly returned a
verdict of not guilty.235 Furthermore, today’s juries may be seduced by evidence that
purports to be the product of state-of-the-art computer software due to our society’s
excessive trust in computers as irrefutably accurate.236 These concerns over undue
prejudice are well founded and could easily have an impact on the admissibility of fMRI
evidence in Oklahoma.
Judges may also see “confusion of the issues” or “misleading the jury” as a
concern when evaluating fMRI evidence under section 2403 because they fear a jury may
not be able to fully understand the evidence.237 In Daubert, the Court noted this
possibility, stating “[e]xpert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading because
of the difficulty in evaluating it. Because of this risk, the judge in weighing possible
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prejudice against probative force . . . exercises more control over experts than over lay
witnesses.”238 Presenting fMRI evidence would entail at least a cursory explanation of
how the scan is performed and the theory of different mental processes activating
different neural regions. The attorney would then present images of the neural activity
during testimony to the jury and explain why these images support the truth or falsity of
the testimony. Finally, the jury would consider cross-examination of fMRI credibility
which would likely be quite scientific in nature and cover error rates and possible flaws
in the technical process or theory. Clearly, this would all be well-advanced scientific
discussion even as presented to the jury. Although judges have allowed numerous types
of expert testimony on intricate scientific evidence, technology which claims to “read the
mind” certainly pushes the envelope. Thus, a judge could foreseeably exclude this
evidence on the basis that it would confuse a jury and not aid in the ultimate assessment
of a verdict.
An exclusion under section 2403 is especially effective because the trial or
hearing judge has great discretion to find that the probative value of evidence has been
outweighed.239 An appellate court will not reverse a section 2403 ruling unless there has
been a clear abuse of discretion.240 Unlike a Daubert exclusion that is now subject to de
novo appellate review in Oklahoma, it would be fairly simple for a trial judge to exclude
fMRI evidence under section 2403 with little opportunity for the appellate court to
reverse.241
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This very situation arose in United States v. Call, when the Tenth Circuit
reviewed the exclusion of polygraph evidence under the new Daubert standard.242 In
Call, the district court excluded the polygraph evidence under both Daubert and Federal
Rule of Evidence 403, which is nearly identical to Oklahoma Evidence Code section
2403243 and also is subject to review only for abuse of discretion.244 The Tenth Circuit
decision referenced “the danger that the jury may overvalue polygraph results as an
indicator of truthfulness because of the polygraph’s scientific nature.”245 Although the
federal standard for a review of a Daubert analysis is abuse of discretion, unlike in
Oklahoma, the Tenth Circuit still held that it was unnecessary to reach the questions
posed by a review of the district court’s Daubert analysis because the polygraph evidence
was properly excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.246
Remarkably however, in Taylor, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
revisited the balance of probative value under section 2403, despite the high standard of
review for such rulings, and found that the exclusion was an abuse of discretion.247 The
court held that DNA sequencing “evidence was highly probative on the issue of the
perpetrator’s identity,” and that it was not unfairly prejudicial; it merely tended to
incriminate the defendant.248 The court made no mention of this relatively advanced and
incredible science confusing the jury or being given too much weight. This language
suggests that Oklahoma courts may see no prejudicial detriment in admitting complex
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novel scientific evidence, even when such breakthrough evidence would likely have a
forceful impact on the jury, as evidence of a DNA match does.
fMRI evidence is quite advanced and new, but no more so than DNA sequencing
was in 1995. Both sciences share a further similarity in that admission of such evidence
could potentially decide the case in which it is introduced. In contrast, polygraph
evidence has long been plagued with a stigma of fallibility, and the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals rejected this evidence specifically because of “the potential
unreliability of polygraph examinations.”249 Such unreliability lessens the probative
value of scientific evidence in a section 2403 balancing analysis. Conversely, fMRI has
demonstrated a very high level of accuracy, which is expected to improve.250 Also,
evidence that could aid a jury in determining credibility is extremely valuable since
research has shown lay people to be quite inaccurate when detecting lies: the accuracy
rates are only around 60%.251 Judge Duniway of the Ninth Circuit discusses this
shortcoming of the jury in a dissent regarding the deference given to credibility
determinations on appeal:252
I am convinced, both from experience as a trial lawyer and from
experience as an appellate judge, that much that is thought and said about
the trier of fact as a lie detector is myth or folklore. Every trial lawyer
knows, and most trial judges will admit, that it is not unusual for an
accomplished liar to fool a jury (or, even, heaven forbid, a trial judge) into
believing him because his demeanor is so convincing. The expression of
249
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his countenance may be open and frank; he may sit squarely in the chair,
with no squirming; he may show no nervousness; his answers to questions
may be clear, concise and audible, and given without hesitation; his
coloration may be normal neither pale nor flushed. In short, he may
appear to be the trial lawyer's ideal witness.

He may also be a

consummate liar . . . . Conversely, many trial lawyers, and some trial
judges, will admit that the demeanor of a perfectly honest but
unsophisticated or timid witness may be or can be made by an astute
cross-examiner to be such that he will be thought by the jury or the judge
to be a liar. He may be unable to face the cross-examiner, the jury, or the
judge; he may slouch and squirm in the chair; he may be obviously tense
and nervous; his answers to questions may be indirect, rambling, and
inaudible; he may hesitate before answering; he may alternately turn pale
and blush. In short, he may, to the trier of fact, be a liar, but in fact be
entirely truthful.253
Thus, a highly reliable scientific means to aid in accurately determining witness
credibility has great probative value. In the case of fMRI evidence, the probative value
of such reliable scientific evidence would be much higher than that of the polygraph test
in past rulings, making it more likely that fMRI’s probative value will outweigh any
possible concerns over prejudice or confusion.254 Because the Oklahoma Court of
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Criminal Appeals found no fault in the level of impact and complexity of highly
probative DNA evidence, it is likely that if fMRI evidence is held to be reliable under
Daubert then this evidence will also pass a section 2403 balancing test.
B. Province of the Jury
While section 2403 addresses concerns about evidence that may have too great an
impact on the jury’s decision, some critics of fMRI evidence, and all lie detection
evidence, suggest that these technologies go beyond influencing the jury and threaten the
very existence of the jury itself. The United States Supreme Court voiced this concern in
Scheffer with regards to the exclusion of polygraph evidence:
A fundamental premise of our criminal trial system is that ‘the jury is the
lie detector.’ Determining the weight and credibility of witness testimony,
therefore, has long been held to be the ‘part of every case [that] belongs to
the jury, who are presumed to be fitted for it by their natural intelligence
and their practical knowledge of men and the ways of men.’ By its very
nature, polygraph evidence may diminish the jury’s role in making
credibility determinations.255
In cases which turn on the credibility of opposing witnesses, a perfect lie detector
could produce an infallible result and the judge would simply rule for the side telling the
truth. No jury would be necessary. In a legal system where the promise of a jury is
paramount, this idea causes deep unrest. Scholars have noted that some judges may
simply reject this evidence because lie detection evidence of any kind encroaches on the
province of the jury to the point that no role is left for the jury.256 The decision in
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Scheffer to allow categorical exclusion of polygraph evidence in court-martial
proceedings was based as much on the fear that “the traditional responsibility of court
members to ascertain the facts and adjudge guilt or innocence would be usurped,” as on a
finding that polygraph evidence was not reliable enough for admission.257 Similarly, in
disallowing polygraph evidence under Daubert, the Tenth Circuit stated that “[t]he
credibility of witnesses is generally not an appropriate subject for expert testimony . . .
because it usurps a critical function of the jury.”258
This line of thinking is consistent with the decades of decisions that have kept
polygraph evidence out of court, and will almost certainly be an argument for excluding
fMRI evidence as well. Nevertheless, we only recently have learned how truly limited
the ability of juries to accurately discern veracity is.259 One argument for admitting fMRI
evidence is that these results will not displace the jury’s fact finding power, but rather
will be a much needed aid to difficult credibility determinations of key witnesses that will
help the jury to better weigh the evidence presented at trial as a whole.260 The dissent in
Scheffer reflected this belief, stating that lie detection evidence does not displace the
jury’s role.261 Instead, evidence that bears on credibility is merely helpful in making a
credibility determination, and proper jury instruction will protect such evidence from
becoming dispositive.262 In cases where the testimony is not self-narrative, judges or
opposing attorneys can always remind the jury of the potential for subjectively honest yet
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mistaken testimony, which would not cement the facts of a case even in the presence of
fMRI evidence of perfect accuracy.
In fact, most sciences can be viewed as either a means to assist the fact finder or
as a means to shift power away from the fact finder, but this has not ultimately resulted in
the exclusion of all science. Even photography was once feared as an advancement that
would usurp the court’s role in fact finding,263 but despite the potential for fraudulent
images photographs are commonly admitted today. Jurors have learned to properly
consider photographs as only one piece of evidence - very influential but not absolute.264
Similarly, fMRI evidence can be adapted to use in court through jury instruction and
cross-examination. These litigation tools can explain the nature of the science as merely
evidence to assist in credibility determinations and can clarify the limitations of fMRI
results. An accurate understanding of the technology will allow the trier of fact to realize
that they still must fulfill their role of evaluating all evidence, including fMRI deception
detection results, to reach a verdict.265
C. Societal Aversion to “Mind-Reading” Technology
In sixteenth century Tudor England, the country was for a time blanketed in fear
because an increasingly tyrannical Henry VIII passed, and enforced through torture, a law
that made the mere thought of treason a crime punishable by death.266 It has long since
been established that thoughts alone cannot be criminally punished, but the fear of a
court’s access to a person’s thoughts for the purpose of adjudication has endured.267 As
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discussed above, fMRI deception detection may prove to be a more accurate and reliable
technology than many well-accepted forms of evidence, but perhaps the most difficult
obstacle to overcome - and the one which is most likely to skew judicial interpretation of
the law - is an inherent distrust of any science which purports to “read a person’s mind”.
The presumption that an individual’s ideas are protected is deeply imbedded in our
society and our constitution, and in an age where privacy is constantly threatened the
mind is often considered the last truly private sanctuary.268 Now, for the first time in all
of history the technology may exist to allow, not our testimony or actions, but our
thoughts themselves to be proven as evidence in court. Scholars are already discussing
the horror of “state action that punishes an individual or holds an individual responsible
for thoughts.”269 One author has theorized that these “Orwellian fears” will play a more
important role in excluding fMRI evidence than the evidentiary codes themselves.270
Some critics have made comprehensive statements that fMRI deception detection
evidence should never be admitted in judicial proceedings. In a public debate regarding
the admissibility of fMRI lie detection, United States District Judge Jed Rakoff was
firmly opposed to admissibility, as revealed in the title to his comments: “Can Science
Detect Lies? Not in My Court.”271 Although Judge Rakoff claimed to respect the
progress being made in this field, he still believed that fMRI deception detection would
lead to more “mischief” than benefit in the courtroom and that veracity is better
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discovered through the traditional means of cross-examination.272 Such absolute
rejection of fMRI technology in the wake of other imperfect scientific developments that
have been admitted, such as DNA, diagnostic medical tests, and complex forensic
evidence, may reflect a deeper held presumption against “mind-reading” science.
Similarly, a recent New York Times article discussed “neurolaw” and whether “the
use of brain-scanning technology as a kind of super mind-reading device will threaten our
privacy and mental freedom,” even suggesting that a new legal concept of “cognitive
liberty” may develop as a result.273 The medical community is aware of this stigma, as
indicated by Joesph Fins’ article entitled “The Orwellian Threat to Emerging
Neurodiagnostic Technologies.”274 Fins’ article discusses why “[i]nterventions which
involve the brain have long been prone to special scrutiny,”275 and urges medical
professionals not to exaggerate the capabilities of neuroimaging technologies lest “their
legitimate diagnostic use [be] undermined and made more difficult.”276
Could Oklahoma courts interpret the law more stringently because there is a fear
of enabling “mind-reading” technologies to gain an undesirable foothold in our legal
system, even when they have realistically satisfied an objective Daubert analysis?
Possibly the language in Slaughter calling brain fingerprinting “interesting,” “startling”
and “unconvincing” reflects exactly this stigma - that such science is uncertain at best,
and surely inappropriate for a stable judicial system. Or perhaps it is merely a wellearned reaction to poorly presented evidence with almost no documented support for an
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admittedly revolutionary claim. Perhaps Oklahoma courts will embrace fMRI deception
detection evidence once it satisfies the Daubert standard, just as they have embraced MRI
and CAT scan results as beneficial and now commonplace advancements. Still, the fact
remains that there is at least some societal aversion to technologies which purport to
invade the mind.277 This may not bar fMRI from admissibility in Oklahoma court, but it
likely will not make the evidentiary hurdles easier, so the doctors and scientists
promoting fMRI evidence had better be ready to put on a good show when their day in
court comes.
D. Further Concerns
Even if fMRI deception detection passes the numerous admissibility hurdles
under the Oklahoma Evidence Code, there is a wide array of other concerns that critics
have raised as affecting the potential legal uses of this science. Could an individual be
forcibly subjected to fMRI testing? If so, then in what situations and under what
conditions? Because of the compelling nature of fMRI deception detection results as
potential evidence, this science will face rigorous scrutiny under constitutional law,
health care and research regulations, employment regulation and even with regard to
homeland security, and the outcomes will likely be observed by Oklahoma courts. This
comment will mention these concerns, although a full understanding of each issue will
reach far beyond the scope of evidentiary analysis and this comment.
Perhaps the most common of these issues is the implications of fMRI evidence in
the context of constitutional law. The Bill of Rights is intended to protect against
inappropriate methods for obtaining evidence, namely the Fourth Amendment prohibition
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against unreasonable search and seizure and the Fifth Amendment prohibition against
compulsory self-incrimination.278 Such offenses are most likely when the evidence is
potentially powerful, as in the case of fMRI deception detection results.279 Because fMRI
results produce evidence from an individual’s body, the individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy and to compel an fMRI would constitute a search, despite the fact
that the information is retrieved without physically intruding into the body.280 As a
result, without the consent of the individual the government would need a warrant based
on probable cause that this person’s testimony is or would be false.281 This would most
likely be a reasonable search, however, as a scan that poses little or no risk to the subject
is even less invasive than the forcible taking of blood which is held to be reasonable.282
The second major constitutional matter, the privilege against self-incrimination,
revolves around whether fMRI deception detection results are testimonial or physical.283
The idea of compelled fMRI testing is problematic from the start because even minimal
head movement during the procedure could destroy the accuracy of the result,284 and it
would be difficult to prevent an individual from moving if they were disinclined to
participate willingly. Severe sedation is a poor solution because this would not result in
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acceptable cognition for providing testimony.285 Even if this problem is resolved
however, the Fifth Amendment prevents an individual from being compelled to
incriminate him or herself.286 If the nature of compelled fMRI results which provide
answers to questions directly related to litigation are held to be within the scope of
“testimonial,” then the Fifth Amendment will prevent this evidence from being
admitted.287 This could be possible if the court finds that in proffering fMRI deception
detection results “the State use[s] as evidence against [the subject of the fMRI] the
substance of his disclosures.”288 Conversely, the physical and scientific nature of the
procedure may be found similar to fingerprints, urine or blood samples, which do not
offend the self-incrimination clause.289 Currently, there is no clear indication towards
either outcome.290
Nevertheless, such constitutional questions are likely irrelevant at this point
because fMRI evidence is not currently being promoted as evidence for prosecutors;
According to Laken, all current interest in the use of fMRI deception detection in court
comes from defendants or judiciary interest in use for defense purposes.291 A voluntary
fMRI procedure would avoid both the self-incrimination issue and the reasonable search
and seizure issue, and for now would focus only on evidentiary obstacles. Although
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these questions may come into play later, it is highly unlikely that they will have any
effect on the initial admissibility rulings in Oklahoma court.292
Another peripheral concern is how to treat the results of fMRI research which
inadvertently reveal a medical condition of the subject being examined. Privacy rights
could potentially be implicated if the subject does not wish to know about the
condition.293 There is also a risk that the information could be leaked to discriminatory
employers despite confidentiality agreements.294 The Americans with Disabilities Act
limits an employer’s use of medical examinations that screen for certain traits, but the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has excluded “tests designed and used only
to measure honesty” from the definition of medical examinations.295
There are also certain regulations pertaining to the polygraph test which may be
interpreted to apply to fMRI technology. For example, a 2005 federal statute, the
Employee Polygraph Protection Act, states that with certain exemptions it is unlawful for
an employer to subject an employee to a “lie detector test.”296 Lie detector test for this
purpose is defined as “polygraph . . . or any other similar device (whether mechanical or
electrical) that is used . . . for the purpose of rendering a diagnostic opinion regarding the
honesty or dishonesty of an individual.”297 Although fMRI is not specifically named, it is
highly likely that this statute will be applied to any neuroimaging lie detection technology
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because of the statute’s clear intent to encompass as-yet-undeveloped or unlisted lie
detection methods.
One last issue worth mention is the potential implications the war on terror may
have on fMRI deception detection development. The government is highly interested in
acquiring advanced and accurate lie detection technology, as evidenced by the
tremendous amount of funding from the Department of Defense and the Department of
Homeland Security designated to investigating polygraphs and neural sciences,298
although these technologies differs greatly from the fMRI application discussed in this
comment. Amid intense current debate over the balance between controversial detention
practices such as water-boarding and the protection of U.S. citizens, the government
interest in technology to accurately and harmlessly determine truth may grow. At the
least, it may affect the attitudes toward and regulation of fMRI. One author hypothesizes
that the U.S. “legal response to the war on terror” may pave the way to “justifying the use
of privacy invasive techniques,”299 such as fMRI. Even a leading researcher, Scott Faro,
M.D., believes that fMRI will likely be applied to “issues related to terrorism, national
security, and high-level corporate crime,” and that in these realms the exorbitant cost of
fMRI tests for mere screening “could be worth it.”300 Although such developments are
merely speculative at this time, fMRI technology certainly has the potential to incite
debate in the areas of privacy and national security.
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As seen in these examples, fMRI deception detection has the potential for
application in many different contexts and will face distinctive challenges in each.
Although it is yet unknown how judges may rule with regard to many of these situations,
in all cases where fMRI evidence is proffered in court, this science will first have to
overcome admissibility hurdles which mirror or are similar to those in the Oklahoma
Evidence Code.301 Still, it is advantageous to be familiar with the emerging issues which
could immediately develop if fMRI evidence does survive a Daubert analysis and the
section 2403 balancing test.
VII. Conclusion
Without a recorded case of fMRI deception detection evidence being offered at
trial, this new science faces uncertainties, but amid continual study and escalating
accuracy rates the potential for fMRI deception detection is undoubtedly phenomenal. In
Oklahoma court, admissibility will turn on the Daubert standard for reliability and the
section 2403 balancing test, evidentiary hurdles which nearly mirror their counterparts in
the Federal Rules of Evidence and many other states. Although Daubert presents several
factors which scrutinize the reliability of a science, fMRI deception detection has been
thoroughly subjected to extensive testing, publication and peer review, and has produced
extraordinary accuracy rates without being refuted by a single publication in the field of
neuroscience.302 fMRI deception detection is a unique science, set apart from
polygraphs, other neuroimaging techniques, and even other fMRI applications. It should
properly be analyzed as such and not subjected to preconceptions associated with any
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previous methodologies presented as science. The Daubert factors essentially question
the reproducibility and accuracy of a novel science in a way that gives it equal footing
with long-established sciences, and if analyzed objectively, fMRI deception detection
should pass with flying colors.
Section 2403 does present an opportunity for stigmas against “mind reading”
technology, or alternately a fear of science that might usurp the jury’s role, to be manifest
in a ruling that bars fMRI evidence as being overly influential or confusing to the jury.
Nevertheless, accurate fMRI deception detection evidence has a very high probative
value and can be assimilated into the legal context in the same way that DNA, CAT
scans, forensics, and many other types of evidence have, even though these
advancements were, at their time of first impression, equally astounding and persuasive
as evidence. Oklahoma courts have not shown an aversion to novel science or applied
the evidentiary standards in an especially severe way. Oklahoma’s judicial system is
quite capable of evaluating and appropriately applying what will likely become an
invaluable legal tool.
As Professor Henry T. Greely states, “The invention by neuroscientists of
perfectly or extremely reliable lie-detecting or truth-compelling methods might have
substantial effects on almost every trial and on the entire judicial system.”303 However,
fMRI evidence remains a reliable science that satisfies the requirements of the Oklahoma
Evidence Code. The implications of a technology that can ascertain deception goes to the
heart of the goal of our jurisprudence: to determine and promote veracity and justice.
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Rather than fear the misapplication of such an important advancement, courts should
eagerly anticipate the development of law that allows the judicial system to employ fMRI
deception detection in the ongoing quest for truth.
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